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ABSTRACT 
An entitlement system is a political institution which 
accords various citizens rights to veto specific changes of social 
state. This paper concerns the performance of such institutions, 
in the absence of other centralized decision-making institutions. 
Specifically, questions relating to unbiasedness (the potential 
of an institution to support any Pareto-efficient social state as 
an equilibrium) in situations with externalities are discussed. 
Necessary conditions for an entitlement system to be unbiased 
regardless of a society's technology are found, and these conditions 
are shown to be sufficient when technology and preferences satisfy 
some geometric conditions (e.g., convexity). However, counter-
examples to unbiasedness are provided when these conditions fail. 
It is argued that, even when an entitlement institution is unbiased, 
extensive information is required to verify this fact. The 
difficulty of systematically designing an unbiased system qualifies 
Hayek's assertion that such a system would be informationally 
efficient in operation. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Two types of answer have been given to the question of how 
government should contribute to the happiness of its citizens. One is 
that it should take a direct (and perhaps coercive)role in the pursuit 
of optimality or efficiency. The other is that it should indirectly 
promote voluntary cooperation among its citizens by providing procedural 
justice (e.g., enforcement of property rights) to them.1 
This paper addresses the question of how cooperative equilibria 
of a "minimal government" (one which guarantees rights but which does 
not make direct allocative decisions) would compare with social states2 
which are Pareto efficient for its citizens. Specifically it examines 
whether or not such a government would be unbiased (i.e., whether every 
Pareto-efficient social state would be possible to support as a 
cooperative equilibrium3) in an environment where its citizens might 
impose externalities on one another. Unbiasedness of equilibrium could 
be interpreted to mean that under ideal circumstances (i.e., that 
cooperative outcomes would in fact be achieved) a minimal government would 
be procedurally fair. However, unbiasedness would also imply that such 
a government could not guarantee an egalitarian distribution of wealth, 
or any other feature except Pareto efficiency, in an equilibrium 
social state. 
The specific form of a "minimal government" to be studied here 
is suggested bv the political theories of Fredrick Hayek [4], John 
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Rawls4 [8], and Robert Nozick [6]. Following Nozick, this sort of 
government will be called an entitlement system. An entitlement is a 
right accorded to some person to veto a particular change of social 
state. An entitlement system will be called pure if it is the only 
institution of government (as Hayek and Nozick seem to envision) rather 
than being a branch of a more extensive government (as Rawls recommends). 
A formal theory of entitlement systems is presented, and a 
cooperative equilibrium concept for pure entitlement systems is defined, 
in section two.5 Some examples of unbiased entitlement systems, including 
markets in private-goods economies, are presented in section three. Then, 
in section four, necessary conditions are stated for an entitlement 
system to be unbiased regardless of the technology available to society, 
and informal examples of how bias may occur are proposed. Section five 
presents a restatement of section four within the formal entitlement 
theory. The informational requirements for the conditions to be 
satisfied are examined in section six. Sufficient conditions for an 
efficient state to be an entitlement equilibrium ( and hence, if they 
hold for every state, for a system to be unbiased) are established in 
section seven, and their indispensability is shown in section eight. 
Section nine, in which the implications of this paper for political 
theory are discussed, concludes the paper. 
There are three appendices. Appendix A explains why unbiasedness 
may be of interest even to libertarians who reject utilitarianism as a 
foundation for political philosophy. Appendix B describes the relationship 
between this paper and the work of Ronald Coase [2] on property-rights 
systems. Appendix C contains the proof of a technical result used in 
the paper. 
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Material has been organized so that sections 2, 3, 4,6, and 9 
constitute a fairly complete informal exposition, and so that sections 
2, 5, 7 and 8 provide a logically self-contained formal treatment. 
II. ENTITLEMENT SYSTEMS AND THEIR EQUILIBRIA 
Consider a society which is in some historically given 
situation or social state. An entitlement system is a government which 
does not perturb the social state directly, but which allows private 
individuals to make changes. These changes are proposed unilaterally, 
but are subject to veto. The role of the government is to assign 
entitlements, or veto rights against particular changes of social state, 
to various individuals. A social state is an equilibrium of the government 
if no one can change it to his advantage without harming someone else 
who is entitled to exercise a veto. Such an equilibrium state will be 
called final. 6 
Entitlement systems are now described formally. The veto rights 
of an individual (or agent) are specified indirectly in terms of a 
relation, his ascribed welfare, which will determine the set of changes 
of social state which he is not entitled to veto. This indirect 
specification of veto rights corresponds to the notion of "legitimate 
expectation" in political theory. Technically, it will simplify the 
statement of conditions on entitlements to be introduced later. 
Let N be a finite set of agents (i, j range over N), and let 
X be a set of social states (x, y,z range over X). It is assumed that 
(1) X is a subset of Ek (k-dimensional Euclidean 
space) with nonempty interior. 
A subset P. c x2 describes i's preference. 1 
mean that i considers x to be strictly better than y. 
Interpret xPiy to 
? 
Define R. c x-
1 
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by xRiy if and only if not yPix. It is assumed that 
(2) Ri is a total preordering, and is locally nonsatiated. 
Define the Pareto ordering P .::_ x2 by 
(3)xPy = [3i xPiy and 
V' j xR. y) . 
J 
An entitlement system is an assignment of relations Wi _.:: x
2 
to agents. The relation Wi will be called agent i's ascribed welfare. 
Define xViy to mean that x belongs to the topological closure of
{zjzWiy}. Vi is the set of changes of social state which agent i does not
have the right to veto. I.e., {xjxViy} is i's legitimate expectation 
when state y is the status quo. 
The basic idea of an entitlement system is that an agent's 
legitimate expectation must not be violated without his consent. A change 
of social state from y to x will be made only if (a) some agent would 
desire this change, and (b) there is no agent for whom it would violate 
both his wishes and his legitimate expectation. Call a change which 
meets these criteria a libertarian transition. Formally, define the 
libertarian-transition relation L c x2 by 
(4) xLy = [3i xPiy and V'j (xRjy or xVjy)). 
Let Ac X be the set of attainable social states. A state x E A 
is Pareto efficient in A (or simply efficient in A, for short) if it has 
no P-successor in A, and it is libertarian final in A (or simply final 
in A, for short) if it has no L-successor in A. Being a final state is 
precisely the equilibrium concept for pure entitlement systems which has 
been informally described earlier. Thus, a pure entitlement system is 
unbiased in an environment (specified by agents' preferences and by 
a set of attainable states) if every efficient state is final. 
Two features of finality as an equilibrium concept deserve 
notice. First, since every feasible Pareto improvement is a libertarian 
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transition, all final states are efficient. This fact provides the answer 
to the converse of the question about unbiasedness which is studied here. 
Second, the set of final states can be interpreted as the core of a game 
without side payments in characteristic-function form. Say that x improves 
y for a coalition C � N if (a) xPiy for some iEC, (b) xRiy for all iEC,
and (c) xViy for all i *C. The right-hand side of (4) holds if and only 
if x improves y for some coalition, so the core (i.e., the set of states 
which cannot feasibly be improved) consists exactly of the final states. 
This characterization makes it clear that finality is a cooperative 
equilibrium concept, and suggests that questions of "transaction costs" 
and of strategic manipulability would have to be considered before one 
could assert that an entitlement institution would achieve final 
outcomes in practice. 
Ill. SOME PARETO-UNBIASED ENTITLEMENT SYSTEMS 
There is at least one entitlement system which is unbiased in 
all environments: that which accords to every individual the right to 
veto any proposed change of social state. In a Pareto-efficient state 
no one can then make himself better off without there being some 
aggrieved person who would be entitled to veto the change. Thus every 
efficient state will be final. 
However, even among those who strongly emphasize the need to 
protect individuals' rights, there are many who doubt the necessity or 
desirability of requiring unanimous consent for every action or change. 
For instance, according to Cease, "The problem which we face in dealing 
with actions which have harmful effects is not simply one of restraining 
those responsible for them. What has to be decided is whether the gain 
from preventing the harm is greater than the loss which would be suffered 
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elsewhere as a result of stopping the action which produces the harm." 
[2, p. 27] Similarly, Hayek has stated that "in the course of this 
process [of legal evolution] it will be found not only that not all 
expectations can be protected by general rules, but even that the chance 
of as many expectations as possible being fulfilled will be most enhanced 
if some expectations are systematically disappointed." (4, v.l, p.102] 
Another entitlement system which is unbiased in an important 
class of environments is a market: A private -goods economy is an 
environment in which social states are allocations and in which each 
agent's preference between social states depends only on a comparison 
of the consumption which they yield to him. A market is an entitlement 
system which allows an agent to veto a change of state if it affects his 
own consumption bundle. (Formally, each agent has a consumption set X
i
, 
X = i�NXi, and xWiy = xViy = xi=yi.) Since in a private-goods 
environment an agent's consumption bundle is affected whenever he is 
harmed, all libertarian transitions must be Pareto improvements. Thus, 
as with the unanimous-consent system, all efficient states are final. 
Note that the final states in this example are precisely the 'contract 
curve'. In the absence of geometric restrictions (e.g., convexity of A), 
final allocations are not assured to have supporting prices. 
In the preceding examples, unbiasedness was proved by showing 
that the Pareto ordering and the libertarian-transition relation are 
identical. These relations do not have to coincide in order to assure 
unbiasedness. In fact, the libertarian-transition relation of an unbiased 
entitlement system may even have cycles. An example of this phenomenon 
is shown in figure 1. Here ascribed-welfare relations are constructed 
by linear local approximation to agents' preference relations. It is 
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assumed that, for every agent i and every state x, the upper-contour set 
of P
i 
at x (i. e., {y j yP
ix}) is open and has a unique supporting hyperplane 
at x. Then yWix will be defined to mean that y lies on the same side 
of this hyperplane as the upper-contour set does, and yV
i
x if y belongs 
to the corresponding closed half space. This is shown in figure l (a). 
Figure l (b) is an Edgeworth box. Two indifference curves are 
shown for each agent. State x (resp. y) lies on the lower indifference 
curve of agent 1 (resp. 2) and on the higher indifference curve of agent 2 
(resp. 1). However, because the curves are not linear, xV1y and yV2x. 
This the changes from x to y and back again are both libertarian 
transitions. The libertarian-transition relation contains a cycle. 
Figure l (c) shows a representative efficient state in the 
Edgeworth box. A hyperplane through z (i. e. , the budget line at the 
market-clearing price) supports the upper-contour sets of both agents, 
and separates them. Thus, either agent would want to veto and would 
be entitled to veto any change which would benefit the other. The 
efficient state is final. The supporting-price argument which 
establishes unbiasedness in this example presents the intuition underlying 
the sufficiency theorem for unbiasedness to proved later. 
That the libertarian-transition relation of an unbiased 
entitlement system may have cycles indicates a limitation of the 
significance of unbiasedness. Unbiasedness means that an efficient state 
will be "stable" once it is reached, but it does not guarantee that one 
will ever be reached. Since a libertarian-transition path can cycle 
forever between inefficient states, unbiasedness does not imply that an 
entitlement system would necessarily converge from an arbitrary initial 
state to an efficient state. Even in the absence of "transaction costs" 
and of strategic manipulation, unbiasedness does not rule out the 
possibility of long-run inefficiency. 
IV. NECESSARY CONDITIONS FOR UNBIASEDNESS 
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One way to characterize unbiased entitlement systems is to say 
that they guarantee "enough" veto rights so that any change from a Pareto­
efficient state will be prevented. In the example just given, this was 
accomplished by making agents' ascribed welfare relations closely resemble 
their actual preferences. The question arises, how far can ascribed 
welfare diverge from true preference in an unbiased system? In this 
section, two conditions describing the relation between ascribed welfare 
and preference will be introduced. These conditions must be satisfied 
by an entitlement system in order for it to be unbiased for every set 
of attainable states. (That is, these are necessary conditions for an 
entitlement system operating in a society of agents with fixed preferences 
to be unbiased regardless of the society's technological capability. 
Such an entitlement system will be called uniformly unbiased.) Two 
further conditions will be introduced, in the absence of which one of 
the necessary conditions might hold vacuously. Informal examples will 
be presented to illustrate the four conditions. The conditions and 
examples will be formalizt<d in the next section. 
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The first necessary condition for an entitlement system to be 
uniformly unbiased is that, if there is one agent whose preference is 
violated by a change of state and if every other agent would at least 
weakly prefer that change, then the change must violate the aggrieved 
agent's welfare. The aggrieved agent will be called a lone dissenter, 
and the condition will be called the lone-dissenter requirement. 
An externality problem shows the force of this requirement. 
In a two-agent situation, the requirement is violated whenever one agent 
is able to benefit by imposing a negative externality on the other agent 
without his permission. If the initial state and the state in which the 
externality is imposed are the only attainable states, then the initial 
state is efficient but not final. This violates unbiasedness. 
If there are only two agents, then the lone-dissenter 
requirement rules out all changes which are not Pareto improvements. 
When there are more than two agents, though, a change may be advantageous 
to one of them and disadvantageous to several others. Such a change 
would not be a Pareto improvement, but it would not violate the lone­
dissenter requirement because more than one agent is aggrieved. Again, 
if the two states in question were the only attainable states, an 
entitlement system which permitted the change would be biased. A 
necessary condition to rule out such changes is that, whenever a change 
of social state violates an agent's preference, there must be some agent 
(possibly, but not necessarily, the aggrieved one) who is entitled to 
veto the change. The agent ascribed a welfare loss will be called a 
surrogate for the agent whose preference is violated, and the condition 
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that every aggrieved agent must have a surrogate will be called the 
surrogates requirement. This is the second necessary condition for an 
entitlement system to be uniformly unbiased. 
Although two-agent externality situations violate the lone­
dissenter requirement, they will satisfy the surrogates requirement 
because the perpetrator of the externality is a surrogate for the victim. 
When there are more than two agents, it is possible for the surrogates 
requirement to fail even in cases where the lone-dissenter requirement 
is satisfied. (I. e. , each condition is independent of the other. ) For 
instance, consider the hypothetical case of three automobile manufacturers. 
Volkswagen makes a small diesel car, Honda makes a small gasoline-powered 
car, and Mercedes-Benz makes large cars of both types. Suppose that a 
social state is a pair of market prices, one for gasoline and one for 
diesel fuel. Both Volkswagen and Honda perceive Mercedes-Benz to be a 
threat, and wish the price of both fuels to remain high so that small 
cars remain desirable. However, each small-car manufacturer benefits 
most from an increase in the price of the fuel which its own cars do not 
use. Mercedes-Benz wants the prices of both fuels to remain low. (To 
make this example precise, firms' profits would be expressed as functions 
of weighted price averages. This is done in example 3 of the next section. ) 
In this situation, every social state is Pareto efficient 
relative to the three firms. To see this, first suppose that prices 
change in a way favorable to Volkswagen. Then the price of gasoline 
must rise by more than the price of diesel fuel drops, so the average 
of the two prices is higher and Mercedes-Benz is hurt. In the same way, 
Mercedes-Benz is hurt by a price change which favors Honda. Finally, 
suppose that a price change helps Mercedes Benz. Then the average price 
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of fuel goes down, and the price of at least one of the fuels must drop. 
The small-car manufacturer whose cars use the other fuel must then be 
hurt. 
Consider an entitlement system according to which each firm 
may veto a change when the price of the fuel that its cars 
use is raised. If both prices drop, both Volkswagen and Honda are hurt 
so there is no lone dissenter. However, every firm is viewed as being 
better off, so Volkswagen and Honda lack surrogates. Since Mercedes-Benz 
actually does benefit from the drop in both prices, the change is a 
libertarian transition. The efficient initial price vector is not final, 
so the entitlement system is biased. 
It might be hoped that the lone-dissenter and surrogates 
requirements together would be sufficient, as well as necessary, for 
uniform unbiasedness. It will be shown that they are jointly sufficient 
for unbiasedness in a class of environments satisfying some geometric 
restrictions, if tliP kinds of situation which allow the lone-dissenters 
requirement to be satisfied vacuously (because there are "too many" 
dissenters) are ruled out. One kind of situation occurs when two 
agents have the same preference ordering. Then it can happen that a 
change of social state violates only one preference ordering, so that 
some agent with that ordering ought to be able to veto the change, but 
that the lone-dissenter requirement does not insure this because several 
agents are harmed. The other kind of situation is one in which preferences 
are distributed densely in the population. If one agent is harmed by 
a change, there is someone else sufficiently like him so that he is also 
harmed, so that neither is a lone dissenter. 
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Identity of different agents' preferences is presumably an artificial 
situation, but denseness of preferences might be approximated in a large 
and diverse society. For example, consider a town where a hospital is 
to be built. Everyone would like the hospital to be fairly close to his 
home, but not in his iuunediate neighborhood. Let a social state be 
specified by a location of the hospital within the city (which is densely 
populated). Every state is efficient, because moving the hospital 
inevitably puts it closer to someone at its new location. 
Suppose that agents are allowed to veto changes when the 
hospital is moved away from them. The surrogates requirement is satisfied 
because moving the hospital puts it farther from someone, who is a 
surrogate for those to whom it is now next door. There are no lone 
dissenters, because the hospital cannot be put next door to someone 
without becoming extremely close to his immediate neighbors also. No 
two agents have exactly identical preferences, although neighbors' 
preferences are very similar to one another. Yet, although every 
location for the hospital is efficient, none is final. It can always 
be moved away from someone, and those who suffer from this move (i.e. , 
those in whose iuunediate neighborhood it is placed) are exactly those 
who are ascribed an improvement in welfare. Every change of location 
is a libertarian transition. 
In order that efficiency should coincide with finality, 
preferences must not be completely disparate. In the presence of the 
surrogates requirement, this can be guaranteed by a restriction on 
ascribed welfare. A welfare ascription will be called cohesive if there 
is some potential change of social state (which need not be feasible) 
which would be considered to increase the welfare of every agent. 
(According to the surrogates requirement, this change cannot violate 
the preference of any agent.) It will be required that a welfare 
ascription should be cohesive. 
V. FORMALIZATION OF THE REQUIREMENTS 
In this section, the requirements which have just been 
discussed will be represented in the formal theory defined in 
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section two and will be shown to be independent. That is, geometric 
models of the theory will be constructed in which exactly one of 
the requirements fails, and in which some efficient state is not final. 
The geometric implications of the requirements will be used further in 
proving the sufficiency theorem for unbiasedness. The class of preference 
and welfare relations for which the implications hold will first be 
defined. 
2 Let Q � X . 7 Define Q to be regular at x E X if there is a 
k q E E such that the following are equivalent for all y E X:
(5) q 
• (y-x) > 0 
(6) 3r > 0 (ry + (1-r)x)Qx 
(7 ) 3t > 0 Vr [if O<r<t, then (ry + (1-r)x)Qx]. 
For example, if Q is a strict preference represented by a 
differentiable, quasiconcave utility function, then Q is regular at 
points where this function has a nonzero gradient. (q is the gradient 
vector. ) Regularity is a strong condition which combines elements of 
local nonsatiation, irreflexivity, differentiability and convexity. 
In particular, if Q is regular at a point x in the interior of X, 
then q is unique up to a positive scalar multiple and (x,x) is a 
boundary point of {yiyQx}. Note that (x,x) f Q by the equivalence of 
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(5) and (6). Furthermore, if a total preordering R has an asymmetric 
part which is regular at every point of X, then every upper-contour 
set of R is convex. 
Henceforth it will be assumed that relations Pi and Wi are
regular at point x being considered. The normal vector q in the 
i i definition of regularity will be denoted by p and w for Pi and Wi, 
respectively. Preference relations {pi}iEN will be called first-order
distinct at x i j 
positive 
if p and p are notl\scalar multiples of one another for
i.;. j. This condition makes precise the third requirement discussed in 
the last section, that agents' preferences be distinct. 
The remaining requirements are now stated: The surrogates 
requirement holds at x if 
(8) 3i xPiy implies 3 j  not yVjx.
The lone dissenter requirement holds at x if, for all i 
(9 ) xP iy implies [not yV ix or 3j .;. i xP jy].
The relations Wi are cohesive at x if, for some y EX, 
(10) Vi yWix. 
These three requirements do not refer to regularity in their 
statements. However, under the hypothesis of regularity, the 
i i requirements have implications in terms of the vectors p and w 
Specifically, these implications concern convex cones generated by 
vectors. 1 n k Recall that, if q , . .. ,q are vectors in E ,  the convex 
n i cone generated by them is { l riq lr1, .. . ,r are nonnegative scalars}.i•l n 
1 n { i} This set will be denoted by K[q , • • •  ,q ) or by K[ q i :'.On)• A
fundamental result about cones is 
Farkas' lennna [ 5, p. 3 ] 1 n Let q, q ,. . .  ,q be
vectors in Ek. The following are equivalent:
(ll) 1 n q E K[q ,. • . ,q ] , and
k i 
(12) 'tJz EE [ ('tJi :::= n q • z � O) implies q • z :'.'. O].
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Geometric implications of the requirements are 
stated in the following three lemnas. 
Lennna 1: If the relations Wi are cohesive at a point x in the
interior of X, then there is a vector z E Ek such that 't/i EN wi • z > 0. 
k (Geometrically this means that some open half-space of E contains all
of the wi. )
Proof: Since the Wi are cohesive, there exists y EX with yWix
for all i. Let z = y - x. By the equivalence of (5) and (6) for each
i Wi, w • z>O. (Note that yWix implies (6).) q. e.d. 
Lemma): If the relations Wi are cohesive at an interior point
x of X, and if the surrogates requirement is met at x, then for all i, 
pi €K[{J}j€N].
Proof: Suppose that pi fK[{J}jEN]
. By Farkas' lemma, there is
k i i a z EE such that v' • z:=:O for all j but p • z<O. By lemma 1, there
is a z' E Ek such that J • z' > 0 for all j. A positive scalar t can
lb 
be chosen sufficiently small that, if u • z + tz', then J • u > 0 for all
i j but p •u< O. Because x is in the interior of X, yr•x + ru EX for
sufficiently small positive r. By the equivalence of (5) and (7 ) ,  r 
can be chosen so that yrWjx for all j. Since Wj�Vj, yr
Vjx for all j.
i But p • (yr - x) < O, so not yrRi
x by the equivalence of (5) and (6).
(N.B. Since R is locally nonsatiated by (2) , (5) and (6) imply that 
i P • (yr - x) :'.'. 0 if y rR1x. ) Thus the surrogates condition fails.
Lemma 3: If the relations Wi 
are cohesive at an interior point x
of X, and if both the surrogates requirement and the lone-dissenter 
i i j requirement are met at x, then for all i, p E K[w , {p } j•i'i].
Proof: By leDmla 2, pj • z' > 0 for all j, where z' is the vector
described in lemma 1 with J • z' > 0 for all j. Thus, as in lemma 2,
a state y EX can be found with y Vix, y Pjx for j f. i, but xPiy .r r r r 
This violates the lone-dissenter requirement. 
2 Call a relation Q�X linear if there is a nonzero vector 
q E Ek, independent of x, such that yQx:: q • (y - x) > O. If the
relations Pi and Wi are linear, then 't/i p
1 
EK[{J}jEN] and
i i j \Ii p E K[w , {p } j'#i] are sufficient for the surrogates requirement
and the lone-dissenter requirement, respectively, to hold. These 
facts make it easy to construct and examine some geometric models of 
preference aggregation. 
2 
Four such models will now be presented. In each, X • E 
i i N, A, {p }iEN and {w }iEN will be specified, and Pi and Wi will be 
linear for each i. In each example, it will be shown that one of the 
q.e. d. 
q.e.d. 
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four requirements for uniform unbiasedness will be violated and 
that some efficient state will not be final. The remaining three 
requirements will all be satisfied. (This is left for the reader to 
verify, using the equivalences just described.) These examples 
demonstrate that no proper subset of the requirements is sufficient 
to assure unbiasedness. 
Example 1 (Figure 2(a)) -- Violation of the lone-dissenter 
I 1 2 2 1 requirement: N•{l,2}, A•{(a, b) a+b•O}, p "'W •(1,0), p •w =
(0,1). Let x• (0,0), y• (-1,1). State x is efficient (as is every 
state in A). xP1y, but yP2x and yV1x, so yLx. Thus x is not final.
Example 2 (Figure 2 (a)) -- Violation of the first-order 
distinctness of preferences: This example is identical to the last, 
except that there are two new agents. Agents 3 and 1, and 4 and 2, 
are identfoal respectively. Again, x is efficient but yLx. 
Example 3 (Figure 2 (b)) -- Violation of the surrogates 
requirement: This formalizes the automobile""'lll8nufacturer example. 
2 1 2 3 3 1 N =  {1, 2,3}, A•E , p • (-2,-1), p • (-1,-2), p •w = (1,1), w "'(1,0),
w2• (0,1), let xc (0,0), y• (1,1). Every state is efficient because
1 2 3 2 K[p , p , p ] .. E • However yV1x, yV2x and yP3x, so yLx.
Example 4 (Figure 2 {c)) -- Violation of the cohesiveness of 
ascribed welfare: This example formalizes the hospital example, if 
every agent is imagined to live at the endpoint of his welfare vector. 
2 i N={l, 2,3,4,5},A=E p is the unit vector at angle 2iTT/5 radians.
i i w is the unit vector diametrically opposed to p Every state is
efficient, since K [{pi}i::Sl = E
2• However, if x=(O,O) and y is
2 the endpoint of p , then yP ix for i:: 3 and yVjx for j > 3, so yLx.
VI. INFORMATION NEEDED TO ASSURE UNBIASEDNESS 
The question arises of how much information about an 
environment would be needed in order to decide whether a particular 
entitlement system would be unbiased there. Specifically, what 
information about preferences is needed in order to verify that the 
surrogates and lone-dissenter requirements are met? The 
purpose of this section is to point out that such verification 
18 
is possible only if the entitlement system accords veto rights very 
liberally or if a substantial amount is known about agents' preferences. 
The justification for this claim is that, in order to verify 
that the surrogates and lone-dissenter requirements are met, it must be 
possible to guarantee that entitlements are granted whenever states are 
related in certain ways determined by preference. 
Specifically, in order to verify the surrogates requirement, one needs 
to be sure that no one strictly prefers any state x to any other state y 
such that xViy for all i. That is, it must be known that no agent is
hurt by any change of state which no one has a right to veto. If the 
entitlement system grants veto rights sparingly, then there will be many 
such changes which must be known to be weak Pareto improvements (i.e., to 
hurt no one). 
In addition, the lone-dissenter requirement stipulates that in certain
situations an agent's ascribed welfare must reflect his actual preference. 
In particular this is true whenever an agent has a strict preference 
which is not shared by anyone else. 8 If the entitlement system does not
accord some agent the right to veto a change from x to y, then it must 
be known either that this agent does not strictly prefer x to y or else 
that some other agent shares the strict preference for x over y. Again, 
whenever an entitlement is not given, some knowledge about agents' 
preferences is presupposed in order to verify that a requirement for 
uniform unbiasedness is met. 
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Hayek (4, v. 2, pp. 115-120] has stressed that, compared to an 
activist government, an entitlement system makes very modest demands for 
central acquisition and processing of information in its operation. The 
argument just given suggests that the informational requirements to make 
an ex� choice among alternative entitlement systems (e. g. , in a 
constitutional convention) on the basis of a comparison of their final 
states would be far more extensive. That is, in order to have either 
an unbiased government or a government that is biased in a particular 
way (e. g., towards egalitarianism), the amount of information about 
citizens' preferences that would be needed to choose an appropriate 
entitlement system is comparable to the amount of information that a 
social planner would need to choose an appropriate social welfare function. 
While Hayek's comparison of the informational requirements of an 
entitlement system versus an activist government (i. e. , one which 
directly maximizes a social welfare function) after adoption of a 
constitution may be correct, the amount of information that must be 
gathered at � stage in order for government to be deliberate (i. e. , 
in order for the relation between political equilibrium and Pareto 
efficiency to be foreseen) seems to be approximately equal between the 
two forms of government. 
VII. SUFFICIENT CONDITIONS FOR UNBIASEDNESS
The notion of a system of rights induced by an ascription of 
welfare to agents in society is intended to serve the role which Coase 
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(2] has given to a system of 'property rights'. Coase emphasizes that 
an 'incomplete' assignment of rights would be ineffective; the surrogates 
requirement and the lone-dissenter requirement specify explicitly in the 
present theory how many 'veto rights' have to be provided in order for 
an assignment to be complete. It is further specified that these criteria 
may not be sufficient if preferences are not first-order distinct or if 
the ascription of welfare relations to agents is incohesive. 
Coase argues that a society with a complete assignment of 
rights would perform just like a private-goods economy with voluntary 
exchange: the efficient social states would be the stable outcomes of 
the process of social change constrained by respect for agents' rights. 
He supposes that, like the argument given in section three concerning 
voluntary exchange, the argument for this general proposition would 
involve only consideration of the relation between rights and preferences, 
and not of the specific attributes of individuals' preferences or of 
society's technology. In this respect, the present theory does not conform 
to Coase's assumption. It will be shown in this section that 'complete' 
entitlement systems are unbiased in environments which satisfy some 
geometrical conditions, but examples to be given in the next section 
will establish that these conditions are required to assure unbiasedness. 
The theorem on the finality of efficient states requires 
two hypotheses which have not been used yet. One is the convexity 
of the set A of attainable states. The other is a generalization 
of the minimum-wealth condition of equilibrium theory. This general 
condition will now be stated. A nonempty subset of N is called a 
coalition. A coalition C is a proponent coalition at x if, for some 
yEA, l/iEN i EC : yP ix. A state z E A  is called a concession from
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coalition C at x if VifC zPix. It will be required that every proponent
coalition can make a concession. A theorem about the efficiency of final
states (and hence about sufficient conditions for unbiasedness) can now 
be stated. 
Theorem: Consider a finite society N of agents, i E N  having a 
preference relation Ri which is a locally-nonsatiated total preordering
k of a set X.s;_E of social states. For each i, let Pi be the asymmetric
part of Ri. Let A be the set of attainable social states for this
society, and let x E A  be a Pareto-efficient state in A. Suppose that: 
(a) x is an interior point of X 
(b) Every Pi is regular at x (i.e. (5), (6) 
and (7 ) are equivalent with Q=Pi and
i q 
• 
p ) 
(c) {Pi}iEN is first-order distinct at x
(i.e. i,lj implies that p
1
,ipj)
(d) Every proponent coalition at x has a 
concession at x 
(e) A is convex. 
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Consider an ascription of welfare relations Wi.<:_X to agents in this
society. Suppose that: 
(f) Every Wi is regular at x (i.e. (5), (6) 
and (7 ) are equivalent with Q 
• Wi and
i q"' w )
(g) {Wi}iEN is cohesive at x (i.e. 3y EX Vi E N  yWix)
(h) The surrogates requirement holds at x 
(i.e. for all y EX, all i E N,xPi
y implies
3j not yVjx)
(i) The lone-dissenter requirement holds at x 
(i.e. for all y EX, all 1 E N, xP iy implies
[not yVix or 3j ,ii xPj
y]).
Under assumptions (a) - (i), x is final in A, i.e. not 3y E A  3i E N
[yPix and Vj E N[yRjx or yVjx]].
The proof of the theorem depends on two lemmas: 
Lemma 4: Let x E A, y E A, yPix for some i E N, and Vj E N
pj • (y - x) � O. Then x is not Pareto-efficient in A, if (b), (d) and
(e) hold. 
Proof: Since yPix, there is a (non-empty) proponent coalition
C for y at x. By regularity, pj • (y - x) >O for all j EC. Let z E A
be a concession by C at x. Then pj • (z - x) > 0 for all j f C by
regularity. Define ur"' y + rz. For sufficiently small positive
r, pj • (u - x) > 0 for all j. For such an r, define v • x +tu • r t r 
regularity, vtPj x for all j, for sufficiently small positive 
t.
and vt are in A, by convexity, so x is not efficient in A.
By 
u r
q.e.d. 
Lemma 5: Let J be a finite set of vectors in Ek and suppose
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k that, for some zEE , 'dq E J  q•z>O. Let I.::_J and suppose that, for
some q, q E J K [ I]. Then for some q', q' E J\I and q' f K[J \ {q'}]
or else q' is a positive scAlar multiple of another vector q'' E J\I. 
This lemma is proved in Appendix C. 
Proof of the theorem: Suppose that, contrary to the theorem, x 
is not final in A. It will be shown that, contrary to hypothesis, 
either x is not efficient in A or the lone-dissenter requirement is 
not satisfied at x. 
If x is not final in A, let y E A  and yLx (i. e. 3i[yPix and
'o'j [yRj
x or yV
j x]]). Either 'di p
i• (y - x) ::". 0 or 3i pi• (y - x) < 0. 
i Case 1: lfi p 
• 
(y - x) ::". 0. Then the hypotheses of lemma 4 are
satisfied, so x is not efficient, contrary to hypothesis. 
Case 2: i p • (y - x) < 0 for some i E N. Let C be the proponent
coalition for y at x. Define D={pjlPj • (y - x)':'.O}. C.::_D by
regularity, and i f D. Define J • {pj} j EN U {
J} j fD' 
and define 
I= { Pj} j EDU {
J} j fD' 
By lemmas 1 and 2, 3z EX lfq E J q • z > 0. 
pj (y - x) � 0 for j E D, and by regularity J • (y - x) 2. 0 for
j fD. Thus lfq E I  q • (y - x) �O. By Farkas' lemma, then, p
i f K[I].
Thus lemma 5 is applicable. J\I .::_ {pj}jfD' so by lemma 5,
Pj f K[J\ {p
j
}]
preferences at 
for some j f D. By first-order distinctness of 
h . x, {p }h#j .::. J \ {p
J}. by regularitySince p
j f D, xP .y 
J 
j w • (y - x) ::". 0, soand local nonsatiation, so yV
j
x and thus pj ,,iJ.
Therefore J E J \ {pj}, so K[J, {ph}h#j] ::_ K[J \ {p
j}]. Then
pj fK[J, {p
h
} h#j ], which contradicts the lone-dissenter requirement
by lemma 3. q. e. d. 
VIII. ROLE OF THE GEOMETRIC CONDITIONS 
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In private-goods environments, the unbiasedness of a market 
entitlement system does not depend on the geometric conditions (i. e. , 
convexity of preferences and technology, and the minimum-wealth constraint) 
which are required to assure the existence of supporting prices for 
efficient allocations. In the theorem of the last section, though, 
geometric conditions were used as hypotheses. These conditions were 
satisfied in all of the examples of section five, so whether they are 
indispensable for the theorem does not affect how the examples are 
interpreted. However it is of interest to know whether, even when the 
requirements relating ascribed welfare to preferences are satisfied, there 
may be efficient states of some environments which are not final. It 
will now be shown that this is the case. An efficient state can fail
to be final if some proponent coalition lacks a concession (example 5), 
if the set of attainable states is not convex (example 6), or if 
preference and welfare relations are not regular (example 7 ). 
Local-approximation welfare ascriptions are used in examples 
5 and 6, so the surrogates requirement and the lone-dissenter will be
satisfied because Pi.':. Wi for every i. Example 7 is isomorphic to
example 6, so the requirements will be satisfied there also. It will 
easily be seen that preferences are first-order distinct and welfare 
ascriptions are cohesive, as well. In each of the following three 
2 examples, N = { 1, 2 } and X = E . A state of X will sometimes be denoted
by (a,b), where a and b are the horizontal and vertical coordinates, 
respectively. 
Example 5: A proponent coalition lacks a concession
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1 1 { I 1 (figure 3 (a)): Let p "'W s(l,0), and P1s W1s (x,y) p ( x-y)>O}
2 2 ? 2 Let p c w • (1,0). Define (a,b) P2 (c,d) if (b - a-) > ( d -c ) and
( a, b ) W2 ( c, d )  if (-2c,l) • ( a - c, b - d) >  0 [N.B. This is the
local approximation to P2 at ( c, d )  .] Let A"' { (a, b )  j b � O}. Then
(0,0) and (1,0) are in A, (l,O)P1 (0,0) and (l,O)V2 (0,0), so (l,O)L (O,O)
and (0,0) is not final in A. However, (O,O) is efficient in A because it 
is agent 2's most-preferred feasible state. (Specifically it is the only 
2 
feasible state (a,b) for which b - a � 0.) This fact also entails
that {l}, the proponent coalition of (l,O)at (0,0), has no concession 
at (O,O). 
Example 6: A is not convex (figure 3(b)): Let preference 
and welfare relations be as in the last example. Define A= { (a,b) I 
2 
[a �O and b � 4a ] or [ a >  0 and b � OJ}. Now ( -1/2,1) is a conces-
sion of 1 at (O,O). However (O,O) is still efficient because if 
(a,b) E A  and (a,b) P2 (O,O), then b > 0 so a< 0, which implies that
(O,O)P1 (a,b). (1,0) L (0,0) as before, so the efficient state (0,0) is
not final. 
2 2 Example 7 :  Pi and Wi are not regular: Define f: E � E by
f (a,b) "'(a, b+4 a
2) if a�O and f ( a,b) = ( a,b) if a > O. The function f 
is a differentiable 1 - 1 mapping of the plane onto itself. Define 
(x,y) to be in a relation Pi or Wi in this example if (f (x), f (y))
was in the corresponding relation in example 6, and define x E A  in 
this example if f(x) EA in example 6. f (O,O) 
= (O,O) and f (l,0) = (1,0), 
so (0,0) and (1,0) are in A still and (1,0) L (0,0), and (O,O) is 
still efficient since the image of the Pareto ordering in this example 
is the Pareto ordering of example 6.  A is now the lower half plane,
2.b 
IX . CONCLUSION 
Entitlement theory describes a government which guarantees 
procedural justice to its citizens, but which does not intervene 
directly to move society toward particular goals. Some philosophers 
have argued that ethical restrictions on the institutional form of a 
government make an entitlement system the only juat if iable government . 
Nozick, who holds this position, calls it a "aide-constraint" view. 
However , moat proponents of entitlement systems , even Noz ick and 
others whose advocacy ia baaed on considerations which are not 
primar ily economic , have suggested informally that these governments 
might be optimal in terms of allocat ive efficiency. 
A particularly interest ing claim about the eff iciency of an 
entitlement system is that its equilibria coincide precisely with the 
Pareto-eff icient social states . Depending on one ' s  philosophical 
convictions ,  such a government might be favored because its 
inst itut ional safeguards of rights succeed in preventing any group in 
the population from benefiting systematically at the expense of 
others ,  or else it might be rejected because it fails to assure 
distributional equity or other substantive conditions which not all 
efficient states satisfy . 
Thia paper has been devoted to studying the relationship 
between Pareto efficiency and entitlement equilibrium as a question in 
economic theory. Throughout , at attempt has been made to i solate the 
technical issues raised by this relationship from philosophical 
quest ions. Now, in conclusion, it is appropriate to consider the 
import of the results presented here for a libertarian defense of 
.-
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entitlement theory. Specif ically,  would these results make an 
ent itlement sy stem of government seem more attractive or less ,  if the 
coincidence of eff icient social states and f inal states were held to 
be an important and des irable property? The implications are mixed. 
On the positive side, a handful of intuit ively natural
requirements on the relation between rights and preferences have been 
shown, under some geometric restrictions on preferences and 
technology , to be suf f ic ient for an eff icient state to be f inal. In 
particular, the theorem shows that the presence of externalit ies in an 
environment does not�� cause entitlement systems to be biased. 
Moreover , it is  evident that in the environments cons idered in the 
theorem there are unbiased systems which provide much greater lat itude 
for redistribut ive social change than to the unanimous-consent systems 
which previously were known to be unbiased. 
However , due to limitations of the analy sis offered here, the 
sufficiency theorem must be interpreted caut iously. These limitations 
are sU111Darized by the statement that finality is a static cooperat ive 
equilibrium concept . It is plaus ible that a society beginning in a 
historically determined soc ial state and evolving in a way consistent 
with the libertar ian-successor relation would somehow converge to a 
final state, but the forces that would lead it to do so ( in a direct 
or "purpo seful" way , one would hope ) ,  if the relation has cycles , have 
not been specified . Of more pressing concern is the problem that 
limitat ions on the ability of coalitions to forms under laissez-faire, 
and opportunities for them to engage in strategic manipulation if they 
do form, may make finality an inappropriate equilibrium concept for a 
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positive theory of bow entitlement systems would perform. 
The po s s ibility of strategic manipulation should particularly 
concern libertarians , who argue that the incentive of those in 
authority to advance their own welfare rather than ' social welfare' 
are not adequately taken into account by advocates of centralization . 
This argument, which boils down to a claim that an institution 
designed to implement a social welfare function would be subject to 
strategic manipulation, is not compelling unless libertarians can show 
that their own institutions are strategy proof.  
If  it  is  granted that final states would be reached and 
supported as equilibria, there remain two results which sugge st tha t ,  
in env ironments other than private-goods economies , ent itlement 
institutions are likely to be biased. The first such result is the 
observation that, except for unanimous-consent institutions, 
entitlement sy stems cannot be ascertained to be uniformly unbiased 
unless substantial information about agents '  preferences is available. 
Thus,  even though an unbiased system for some environment might exist 
in principle, there is little reason to believe that it would be 
discovered through a process of constitutional choice or evolution . 
The str ingent informational requirements for choice .!!. ante of an 
unbiased constitution have been ignored by libertarian theori st s ,  who 
have concentrated their attention on the informational parsimony of 
entitlement systems .!!. post. 
The second negative result is that none of the geometric 
restrictions placed on environment s in the sufficiency theorem can be 
removed. These restrict ions correspond closely to the hypotheses used 
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by T. c. Bergstrom [l] to prove the existence of a Lindahl 
equilibrium. Thus , the same phenomena which would prevent an 
eff icient state from being support by a Lindahl price vector may also 
cause the state not to be f inal. In particular, although externality 
does not J!.!!.� cause an entitlement system to be biased , the 
nonconvexity with which externality is often associated (cf.  D. 
Starrett [9]) raises a serious problem. In light of this fact, the 
inference often drawn from the "Coase Theorem," that complete 
pr ivate-goods markets are representat ive of entitlement sys tems in 
general, should be rejected. 
This author' s  opinion is that the negative results presented 
here are the most compelling ones. Unbiasedness of an entitlement 
system, which prior to invest igat ion had seemed like a property that 
would be easy to guarantee , turns out to be fragile (out side of 
private-goods enviromnents )  except in the case of a part icular system 
( i. e . ,  the unanimous-consent institution) which is  widely considered 
unattractive for other reasons. If unbiasedne ss is accepted as a 
criterion of procedural fairness,  then whether a pure entitlement 
sy stem would be more fair in practice than a govermnent which engages 
in well-defined and carefully limited direct activity (as advocated, 
for instance, by Rawls ) is open to quest ion. 
APPENDIX A: UNBIASEDNESS AND FAIRNESS
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In welfare economics , Pareto unbiasedne ss of an institut ion is 
commonly accepted as an indication that the institution is 
proceaurally fair. Some libertarians (notably Nozick [ 6 ,  p. 165 n)) 
are willing to interpret it this way as well. Such libertarians may 
hold unbiasedne ss to be an important and desirable property of a 
govermnent even if they reject ut ilitarian justif ications of 
govermnent . 
Specif ically these libertarians may consider unbiasedness of 
an entitlement system to refute the criticism implicit in the 
characterization by Anatole France of "the majestic equalitariansim of 
the law, which forbids rich and poor alike to sleep under bridge s ,  to 
beg in the streets,  and to steal bread," Such a description suggest s 
that, although laws are written in universal terms which seems to 
promise equal treatment, in fact they work systematically to the 
advantage of some persons at the expense of others. 
A po ssible answer to this charge is that, although any 
institution will affect different persons in different ways 
accidentally as a result of differences in their circumstances, the 
law does not discriminate systematically on the basis of persons' 
intrinsic characteristics. One way to suggest this is to f ind for 
each person the social state which he most prefers among all 
attainable states (typically this most favored state w ill be Pareto 
efficient ) ,  and to show that it can be supported as an equilibrium, 
Depending on the initial state of society, then, the law might work to 
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the advantage of any cit izen. This idea is what Pareto unbiasednes s  
is intended to express. 
The use of unbiasedne ss to represent fairne ss raises numerous 
que stions . To begin with, if an entitlement system is adopted in some 
part icular histor ical circumstance from which it w ill for seeably lead 
to a highly skewed distribution of welf are, why should its different 
performance in some other hypo thetical initial situation be allowed as 
an excuse for this skewed outcome? It is important to recognize that 
the normative interpretation of the results presented in this paper 
depends on the answers to this and other such philosophical que stions. 
APPENDIX B 1 ON THE "COASE THEOREM" 
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Coase ' s  model of rights as market goods has sometimes been 
interpreted as a formalizatin of entitlement theory. Coase has argued 
that all equilibria would be efficient , a proposition which is the 
conver se of the one studied here. He considers only market­
ent itlement systems such as are described in section three of this 
paper. The ascribed-welfare relations which def ine those systems are 
not regular , so the main theorem proved here does not apply directly 
to Coase's model. Nevertheless,  because a device identical to Coase' s 
model is employed in a standard existence proof for Lindahl equilibrim 
and because the conditions given here for f inality to be unbiased are 
the same as those given by Bergstrom [1) for Lindahl equilbrium to be 
unbiased , the theorem proved here for regular entitlement systems (and 
also its geometr ic restrictions ) might be expected to hold a s  well for 
complete property-rights systems . 
There are two formal advantages of the approach taken here to 
studying entitlement systems over that of Coase. First, equilibrium 
is defined here explicitly in terms of a cooperative game in 
characteristic-function form. This enables problems to be squarely 
faced which Coase does not not ice , especially the problem that 
equilibrium may not exist . Coase assumes that the potential rents 
from cooperation w ill in fact be appropriated, but he does not 
indicate how agreement will be reached concerning their dis tribution. 
The unbiasedne ss theorem proved here indicates that cooperative 
agreements can be reached in many environment s, but Example 4 shows 
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that agreement is not automatic . 
Second, the present theory improves on Coase' s  by represent ing 
social states in a "natural" geometrical way. An example of an 
env iro111Dent with conges t ion externalities w il l  make clear what this 
means . Suppose that there are two agent s .  each of whom drives a car 
and each of whom prefer s  to be alone on the road. Suppo se that it is 
not feasible for these agents to coordinate the t imes at which they 
drive, so that the probability that either driver faces congest ion is 
s imply the proportion of t ime s  that the other is on the road . 
Intuitively a social state can be represented in two dimensions by 
spec ifying the amount of driving that each agent doe s .  However, it 
requires four dimensions to describe a complete property-rights 
allocation which specifies both an amount of driving and also a 
( redundant) probabil ity of facing congest ion for each driver . Because 
each agent in tne property-rights market is entitled to veto changes 
of allocation in two dimensions ( i. e . , his dr iving t ime and his 
freedom from conge stion) , which is the full dimension of the space of 
social states ,  the property-rights system in this env iro111Dent is in 
reality a unanimous-consent institution. It is a much more 
restrictive ent itlement system when viewed in two dimensions (the 
"natural" space of social states) than it would seem when considered 
in four . 
Moreover. there is a philosophical problem about taking an 
assig111Dent of rights to be a feature of the social state ( i . e . ,  of the 
allocation ot appropriable goods) rather than of a political 
inst itution. The exercise of a right needs to be distinguished from 
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the right it self . A person who owns neither a house nor an atomic 
bomb may have the right to own a house ( i. e . , he would be allowed to 
keep a house if he were to build it or acquire it in trade) , but not 
to own an atomic bomb. The right to own a house is best represented 
as the right to veto its conf iscation in any state (actual or not) 
where the holder of the r ight is in po ssess ion of a house .  
Hayek [ 4 ,  v .  1 ,  pp . 1 06-109) has expressed other reservations 
about the adequacy of the mater ial-property model to represent his 
version of libertarian theory. 
APPENDIX C :  PROOF OF LEMMA 5 
3 5  
Lemma 5 :  Let J be a fi n i te set o f  vectors i n  Ek and suppose that,
k for some z £ E , Vq £ J q · z > 0 .  Let I � J and suppose that ,  for
some q ,  q £ J\K[ I ] .  Then for some q ' , e i ther q '  £ J\I and q '  � K[J\{ q ' } ]
or e l se q '  i s  a posi ti ve sca l a r  mul ti p l e  o f  another q ' ' £ J\ I .  
Proof:  Let H* 
= {H.:_J I I� .  J � K[H] } .  H* is  fi n i te and nonempty
( because I £ H*) , and i t  i s  parti a l ly o rdered by �. so i t  has a maxima l  
el ement H .  J\ K[H] i s  nonempty , a n d  the l errma wi l l  b e  proved i f  i t  i s  
shown ei ther to ha ve only one el ement  o r  to have two el ements wh i ch are 
pos i ti ve sca l a r  mul tipl es of one anothe r .  Assume that q '  and q"  belong 
to J\K[H] .  I t  wi l l  be shown that q '  i s  a pos i ti ve scal a r  mul ti pl e  of q" . 
Si nce H i s  maxi ma l  i n  H*,  q '  £ K[Hu{q " } ]  and q" £ K[Hu {q ' } ] .  Let 
q '  
= r1 q"  + q1 and q" = r2q • + q2 , where r1 > 0, r2 > 0, q1 £ K[H]
and q2 £ K[H ] .  From these two equations i t  fol l ows tha t
( l - r1 r2 ) q '  = q 1 + r1 q2 . S i nce q '  f K[H ] ,  thi s l ast  equati on can only
be sati sfied i f  r1 r2 = l and q1 = q2 = 0 .  ( Note that q1 + r1 q2 = 0
only i f  q1 = q2 = 0 ,  because otherwi se ( q 1 + r 1 q2 ) · z > 0 . ) Then
q' = r1 q11 and q"  = r2q • . q . e . d .  
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FOOTNOTES 
1 .  These are the principal po sitions in modern const icutional 
theory. Some markedly diff erent answers have been given, notably 
by Plato and Marx. The po s itions are not exclusive. Activ ist s 
admit that some l imits should be put on the goverDment ' s  power of 
conf iscatory redistr ibut ion, and procedural ists see the necessity 
of centrally impo sed decisions in emergency situations like war 
or natural disasters .  
2 .  The term ' state' wil l alway s refer in this paper to a social 
state ( e . g . ,  to an allocation in a pr ivate-goods economy) , and 
w il l  never be used here as a synonym for 'government . '  
3 .  The term unbiasedness ( or Pareto Unbiasednes1) i1 u1ed throughout 
the paper in this technical 1ense . Thi• is a well established 
usage in welfare economics .  The relationship of the technical 
condition to the intuitive notion of unbiasedne11 i1 con1idered 
in Appendix A.  
4 .  Rawl• i s  of ten misinterpreted as advocating use of a maximin 
criterion to choo se smong social �. In fact,  he advocates
apply ing the criterion to eauilibrium 1tates of institut ions in 
order to choose smong the ins t itut ion1 . He puts greater 1tre ss 
on the role of the criterion in j ust ify ing rights of the sort 
modelled h ere (which enabl e  individuals to veto social states 
which would be disastrous for them) than on its role in 
j ust ifying redistributin of endowment s .  Thus, al though he does 
advocate some carefuliy limited redistributive policie s ,  his 
theory does not have the predispo sition towards activism with 
which it is frequently charged . 
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5 .  It is often suggested that the work of Coase [2] prov ides an 
alternative formalization of entitlement theory. The relation 
between that formalization and the one offered here is discussed 
in Appendix B .  Also Gibbard [ 3 ]  has formalized a somewhat 
different l ibertarian theory . 
6 .  there are several passages in libertarin writings which suggest 
that the role of gover11ment should be to guarantee a system of 
veto r ights . Xayek' s statement is that "Coercion can a88ist free 
men in the pursuit of their ends only by the enforcement of a 
framework of universal rules which do not direct them to 
particular ends, but , by enabling them to create for themselves a 
protected domain against unpredictable disturbance caused by 
other men � including agents of gover11ment � to pursue their 
own ends " [ 4 ,  v. 3 ,  p. 131] . A system of ent itlements is 
envisioned also in Rawls' s discussion of the rule of law : "A 
legal system is a coercive order of public rules addressed to 
rational persons for the purpose of regulating their conduct and 
providng the framework for social cooperation. When these rules 
are j ust they establish a ba sis for legit imate expectations . 
They const itute grounds upon which persons can rely on one 
another and rightly obj ect when their expectations are not 
fulfilled" [ i, p .  23 5] . 
3 8  
7 .  This use of the term 'regular' i s  very closely related, although 
not precisely identical, to its use in differential topology 
( i . e . ,  that a function is regular at tho se point s where it has a 
nonzero gradient ) .  The idea of a regular relation was introduced 
by Rader [ 7] , who used the term ' direct ionally dense r elation.' 
8 .  If x is  in the interior of X, preferences are regular at x, and 
the requirements of first-order distinctness and cohes iveness are 
met , then there is a lone dissenter to a change from x to some 
state y .  This follows from Farkas' Le11111& and Lemt3 5 (to be 
stated in the next section) . Thus a very substant ial amount of 
information will be required to verifying that the lone-dissenter 
requirement holds everywhere .  
39 
REFERENCES 
1 .  Bergstrom , T. C . ,  "Col lective Choice and the Lindahl Al location 
Method, "  in Lin, S, , ed. ,  Theory and Measurement of Economic 
External ities, New York: Academic Press, 1 97 6 . 
2 ,  Coase, R. H. , "The Problem of Social Cost, " Journal of Law and 
Economics 3 ( 1960 ) ,  1-44 . 
3 .  Gibbard, A . , "A Pareto-Consistent Libertarian Claim , "  Journal of 
Economic Theory 7 ( 1 974),  388-41 0 .
4 .  Hayek, F .  A . , Law, Legislation and Liberty, Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, v .  1 ,  1 97 3 ; v .  2, 1 97 6 ; v .  3 ,  1 97 9 . 
5 .  Kemp, M, , and Y ,  Kimura, Introductin to Mathematical Economics, 
New York: Springer-Verlag , 1 978 . 
6 .  Nozick, R . , Anarchy, State and Utopia, New York: Basic Books, 
1 974 . 
7 .  Rader, T . , Theory of General Economic Equil ibrium, New York: 
Academic Press , 1 9 7 2 .  
8 .  Rawls, J . , A Theory of Justice, Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1 971 . 
9 .  Starrett, D . , "Fundamental Nonconvexities in the Theory of 
Externalities, " Journal of Economic Theory 4 ( 1 97 2) , 1 80-199 . 
( a )  
F I G U R E  1 
( b )  2 
• �  
( c ) 2 
A 
(a ) 
( c )  
Y, 
p2 
w s
p 3 
F I G U R E  2 
p2 = w l 
P.4 = w3 
A 
w.4 
pl = w 2 
p3 = w .4 
w3 
w2 
w2 y 
p 3 = w 3 
w l 
( a )  
( b ) 
F IG U R E  3 
b-a2 = O
p2 = w 2 
b -.4a2 = 0
b-a2 .= o  
P2= w2
